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Abstract
In this paper we reconcile two opposing views about the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption (EIS). Empirical studies using aggregate con-
sumption data typically ￿nd that the EIS is close to zero (Hall, 1988). Calibrated
models designed to match growth and ￿ uctuations facts typically require that the
EIS be close to one (Lucas, 1990). This apparent contradiction is resolved when
two kinds of heterogeneity are acknowledged: One, the majority of households do
not participate in stock markets; and two, empirical evidence indicates that the EIS
increases with wealth. We introduce these two features into a standard real business
cycle model. First, limited participation creates substantial wealth inequality as in
the U.S. data. Consequently, the properties of aggregates directly linked to wealth
(e.g., investment and output) are mainly determined by the (high-EIS) stockhold-
ers. At the same time, since consumption is much more evenly distributed in the
population, estimation from aggregate consumption uncovers the low EIS of the
majority (i.e., the poor).
Keywords: The elasticity of intertemporal substitution, limited stock market participation, business
cycle ￿uctuations, incomplete markets, wealth inequality.
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1. Introduction
A rational agent will seize intertemporal trade opportunities revealed in asset
prices by adjusting her consumption growth, by an amount inversely related to
her (counteracting) desire for a smooth consumption pro￿le. The degree of this
consumption growth response is called the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption (EIS). Research in many ￿elds of macroeconomics has established
the EIS as crucial for many questions ranging from the e⁄ects of monetary and
￿scal policies to the determinants of long-run economic growth (see, for example,
Summers, 1981; King and Rebelo, 1990; Jones, Manuelli and Stacchetti, 1999).
The goal of this paper is to use macroeconomic analysis to reconcile seemingly
contradictory evidence about the value of this parameter.
On the one hand, macroeconomists generally use a value close to 1, re￿ ecting
the view that a high degree of intertemporal substitution is more consistent with
aggregate data viewed through the lens of dynamic macroeconomic models. To




t = ￿ + (1=EIS) ￿ log(Ct+1=Ct); (1)
where ￿ is the time preference rate. For convenience we abstracted from uncer-
tainty.1 Given that the annual per-capita consumption growth in the U.S. is about
2 percent, an elasticity of 0.1 as estimated by Hall (1988) together with ￿ > 0 imply
a lower bound of 20 percent for the real interest rate! This observation is well-
known as Weil￿ s (1989) risk-free rate puzzle. Alternatively, substituting a realistic
average interest rate of 3 percent, and a consumption growth of 2 percent requires
the EIS to be at least 0.66 if ￿ is to be positive. In fact, a similar observation has
led Lucas (1990) to rule out an elasticity below 0.5 as implausible (in his notation
￿ ￿ 1=EIS) :
If two countries have consumption growth rates di⁄ering by one per-
centage point, their interest rates must di⁄er by ￿ percentage points
(assuming similar time discount rates). A value of ￿ as high as 4 would
thus produce cross-country interest di⁄erentials much higher than any-
thing we observe, and from this viewpoint even ￿ = 2 seems high.
Similarly, Jones, Manuelli and Siu (2000) have examined the volatilities of the
macroeconomic time-series generated by a real business cycle model and concluded
that they match the U.S. data the best when the EIS is calibrated to be between
0.8 and 1. For many macroeconomists reasoning like these constitute convincing
evidence that the EIS is quite high, probably close to 1.
On the other hand, an alternative approach is to use the conditional consump-
tion Euler equation, and estimate the EIS from the co-movement of aggregate con-
sumption with asset returns (Hansen and Singleton, 1983; Hall, 1988). This line of
1The following argument is robust to the introduction of uncertainty and generalizing prefer-
ences to the Epstein-Zin (1989) utility function, because an equation very similar to (1) can still
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research, however, has reached a completely di⁄erent conclusion. In an in￿ uential
paper Hall (1988) has argued that consumption growth is completely insensitive to
changes in interest rates and, hence, the EIS is very close to zero. The subsequent
empirical macro literature has provided further support (see Campbell and Mankiw,
1989; Browning, Hansen and Heckman, 1999, and the references therein).2 Thus,
there is an apparent contradiction between the dynamic macroeconomics literature
and econometric studies which both use aggregate data in di⁄erent ways.
We show that this apparent inconsistency is largely a consequence of the ￿rep-
resentative agent￿perspective widely adopted in both literatures. To this end, we
study an otherwise standard real business cycle model and introduce two key sources
of heterogeneity: limited participation in the stock market and heterogeneity in the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. A large body of empirical evidence will be
presented in Section 3. documenting these facts. Speci￿cally, we consider an econ-
omy with neoclassical production and competitive markets. There are two types of
agents. The majority of households (second type) do not participate in the stock
market where one-period risky claims to the aggregate capital stock are traded.
However, a risk-free bond is available to all households, so non-stockholders can
also accumulate wealth and smooth consumption intertemporally. Finally, consis-
tent with the empirical evidence reviewed in Section 3., stockholders are assumed
to have a higher EIS (around 1.0) than non-stockholders (around 0.1).
The main result of the paper can be explained as follows. In the model, limited
participation creates substantial wealth inequality matching the extreme skewness
observed in the U.S. data. Consequently, the properties of aggregate variables
directly linked to wealth, such as savings, investment, and output are almost entirely
determined by the (high-elasticity) stockholders who own virtually all the wealth
(capital) in the economy. On the other hand, consumption turns out to be much
more evenly distributed across households, again as in the U.S. data, so aggregate
consumption￿ and hence Euler equation estimations￿ mainly reveal the low EIS
of the majority, that is, the poor. As a result, the model delivers several business
cycle statistics that appear to be generated from a representative agent RBC model
with an EIS of 1 (Section 4.), while at the same time a Hall-type Euler equation
estimation uncovers an EIS of around 0.25 (Section 6.).
This explanation clearly relies on the premise that the average investor is very
di⁄erent than the average consumer. Section 4.1. documents the remarkably di⁄er-
ent concentrations of wealth and consumption in the U.S. data. For example, the
richest 20 percent own 83 percent of net worth and 95 percent of ￿nancial assets,
but account for only about 30 percent of aggregate consumption (Fig 1). Moreover,
it is clear that the ability of the model to generate this substantial wealth inequality
is crucial for our results, otherwise the average consumer and investor would be sim-
ilar in the model. Further, since similar models with a dynastic structure typically
yield too little wealth inequality, section 5. explains how the introduction of limited
participation into such a framework generates substantial heterogeneity. Finally, an
appendix shows￿ in the context of a capital income taxation problem￿ that policy
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conclusions drawn from a representative-agent model calibrated to the EIS obtained
from Euler equation estimations can be seriously misleading.
1.1. Related Literature
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The ￿rst one, starting with
an in￿ uential paper by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), investigates the role of lim-
ited stock market participation in resolving asset pricing puzzles (Basak and Cuoco
1998; Attanasio, Banks and Tanner 2002; Guvenen 2004). However, despite the
increasing number of studies in this ￿eld, the main focus so far has been on asset
prices and less attention has been devoted to the macroeconomic implications of this
phenomenon which remain largely unexplored. In this paper we attempt to close
this gap by studying the role of limited participation in generating inequality in
wealth and consumption, and consequently, in shaping the determination of macro-
economic aggregates. A second literature estimates the EIS using di⁄erent versions
of the log-linearized Euler equation. Although some early studies (Summers, 1981;
Hansen and Singleton, 1983) obtained estimates of the EIS around 1.0, Hall (1988)
argued that these estimates were biased upward because of the time aggregation
in consumption data. More recently, Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) have argued that
non-separability between durables and non-durables could bias the estimates of EIS,
such as Hall￿ s (1988) in the opposite direction￿ downward￿ if not accounted for.
Similarly, Basu and Kimball (2000) have shown that non-separability between con-
sumption and leisure could create a similar downward bias. Both papers obtained
estimates of the EIS around 0.35. Compared to these studies, this paper stresses a
di⁄erent economic point: even when the Euler equation is estimated without any
problems, the resulting estimate of the EIS (which is necessarily an ￿average￿of in-
dividual elasticities) is not the appropriate measure of elasticity for many questions,
especially those related to savings, investment, and output.
2. The Model
For transparency of results, our modeling goal is to stay as close to the standard
real business cycle framework as possible and only introduce the two key features
discussed above.
2.1. The Firm
There is a single perishable consumption-investment good in this economy. The
single aggregate ￿rm converts capital (Kt) and labor (Lt) inputs into output accord-
ing to a Cobb-Douglas technology: Yt = ZtK￿
t L
1￿￿
t ; where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the factor
share parameter. The stochastic technology level Zt follows a ￿rst-order Markov
process with a strictly positive support. In the absence of any intertemporal links
in the ￿rm￿ s problem (such as capital adjustment costs, etc.) the ￿rm￿ s decision








t + ￿)Kt ￿ WtLt
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where Rs
t and Wt are the market return on capital and the wage rate respectively,
and ￿ is the depreciation rate of capital.
Finally, capital and labor markets are competitive implying that the factors are
paid their respective marginal products after production takes place:
Rs
t = ￿Zt (Kt=Lt)
￿￿1 ￿ ￿ (2)
Wt = (1 ￿ ￿)Zt (Kt=Lt)
￿ :
2.2. Households
We consider an economy populated by two types of agents who live forever. The
population is constant and is normalized to unity. Let ￿ (0 < ￿ < 1) denote the
measure of the ￿rst type of agents (who will be called ￿stockholders￿later) in the
total population. Both agents have one unit of time endowment in each period,
which they supply inelastically to the ￿rm.
2.2.1. Preferences
Agents value temporal consumption lotteries according to the following Epstein-

















0 6= (1 ￿ ￿);’i < 1 (3)
for i = h, n. Throughout this paper the superscripts h and n denote stockholders
and non-stockholders respectively. The subjective time discount factor under cer-
tainty is given by ￿ ￿ 1=(1 + ￿), and ￿ is the risk aversion parameter for wealth
gambles, common to both types. The focus of attention in this paper is the EIS
parameter which is denoted by ￿i ￿
￿
1 ￿ ’i￿￿1
and as the superscript i indicates,
types may di⁄er in their intertemporal elasticities.
Before proceeding further, it is important to stress that our choice of recursive
preferences is for clarity: by disentangling risk aversion and the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution, this speci￿cation allows us to introduce heterogeneity in
the EIS without generating corresponding di⁄erences in risk aversion. It is worth
noting though that risk aversion plays little role in the model: even assuming CRRA
utility delivers practically the same results as long as the calibration of the EIS re-
mains the same as here. Finally, note that these preferences nest expected utility
as a special case: when ’ = 1 ￿ ￿; this speci￿cation reduces to the familiar CRRA
expected utility function.
2.2.2. Stock Market Participation
Besides the productive capital asset there is also a one-period risk-less household
bond (in zero net supply) that is traded in this economy. The crucial di⁄erence be-
tween the two groups is in their investment opportunity sets: the ￿non-stockholders￿
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market. The ￿stockholders,￿on the other hand, have access to both markets and
hence are the sole capital owners in the economy.3
Finally, we impose portfolio constraints as a convenient way to prevent Ponzi
schemes. As we discuss later, for the main results of the paper these constraints
need not bind; they can be as loose as possible.
2.3. Households￿Dynamic Problem and the Equilibrium
To state the individual￿ s problem recursively, the aggregate state-space for this
economy needs to be speci￿ed. The Markov characteristic of the exogenous driving
force naturally suggests concentrating on equilibria that are dynamically simple.
That is, we assume that the portfolio holdings of each group together with the
exogenous technology shock constitute a su¢ cient state space which summarizes all
the relevant information for the equilibrium functions.
In a given period; the portfolios of each group can be expressed as functions
of the beginning-of-period capital stock, K, the aggregate bond holdings of the
non-stockholders after production, B; and the technology level, Z: Let us denote
the aggregate state by ￿ ￿ (K;B;Z), and the ￿nancial wealth of an agent by
! where superscripts are suppressed for clarity of notation. Given the recursivity
of the utility and the stationarity of the environment, maximization of (3) for the
stockholders can be expressed as the solution to the following dynamic programming
problem:















C + q (￿)b0 + s0 ￿ ! + W (K;Z)
!0 = b0 + s0 (1 + Rs (K0;Z0))
K0 = ￿K (￿)





where b0 and s0 denote bond and stock (capital) choice of the agent respectively. The
endogenous functions ￿K and ￿B denote the laws of motion for aggregate wealth
distribution which are determined in equilibrium, and q is the equilibrium bond
pricing function. Note that each agent is facing a constraint on bond holdings with
3It is possible to think of the participation structure assumed here as the endogenous outcome
of a model where every period agents have the option of paying a one-time ￿xed cost of entering
the stock market (if they had not already done so in previous periods). With a cost of appropriate
magnitude, the group of agents with high EIS will enter the stock market whereas the other group
will stay out. This is because, loosely speaking, agents with a low EIS are reluctant to accumulate
wealth quickly and hence their bene￿ts from participation is lower than agents with a high EIS.
See the working paper version of this article (Guvenen 2003, Section 9) for further discussion. In
Guvenen (2004) we quantify the magnitude of this participation cost in a version of this model
with capital adjustment costs in production. For the purposes of this paper, the present setup
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possibly di⁄erent (and negative) lower bounds. The problem of the non-stockholder
can be written as above with s0 ￿ 0:
A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is given by a pair of value
functions V i ￿
!i;￿
￿
;(i = h;n), consumption and bondholding decision rules for











; a bond pricing function, q (￿); competitive factor prices, Rs (K;Z);
W (K;Z); and laws of motion for aggregate capital and aggregate bond holdings of
non-stockholders, ￿K (￿); ￿B (￿); such that:
1) Given the pricing functions and the laws of motion, the value functions and
decision rules of each agent solve that agent￿ s dynamic problem
2) Factors are paid their respective marginal products (equation (2) is satis￿ed)
3) The bond market clears: ￿bh ￿
$h;￿
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)bn ($n;￿) = 0; where $i
denote the aggregate wealth of a given group; and the labor market clears: L =
￿ ￿ 1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1 = 1






B0 = (1 ￿ ￿)bn ($n;￿) (5)
3. Numerical Solution and Calibration
The model is solved using numerical methods since an analytical solution is not
available. As usual the existence of aggregate shocks introduces an additional layer
of complexity. Instead of approximating the equilibrium functions around the sto-
chastic steady state (for example, as in Krusell and Smith, 1998) we solve for all
the functions globally over the state space. Although this generality has additional
computational costs, it also allows us to conduct policy experiments involving tran-
sitions (such as the capital income taxation problem studied in the Appendix) very
easily. Moreover, to our knowledge this is the ￿rst attempt at numerically solving
a dynamic programming problem with general recursive utility. A computational
appendix available from the author￿ s website contains the algorithm as well as a
discussion of the accuracy of the solution.
3.1. Baseline Parameterization
The model parameters are chosen to replicate the long-run empirical facts of the
U.S. economy. The time period in the model corresponds to one year of calendar
time. Following Cooley and Prescott (1995) the capital share of output is set equal
to 0.4. The technology shock Z is assumed to follow a ￿rst-order, two-state Markov
process with transition probabilities ￿ij = P (Zt+1 = j j Zt = i) chosen such that
business cycles are symmetric and last for 6 years on average. This condition implies
￿11 = ￿22 = 2=3: The mean of the technology shock is a scaling parameter and is
normalized to 1. The standard deviation of the technology shock, ￿ (Z); is set equal
to 3.1 percent which is the implied annual volatility assuming that the quarterly
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variation of 1 percent. We also investigate the sensitivity of the results to alternative
calibrations.
3.1.1. Participation rates
Our model assumes a constant participation rate in the stock market, which
appears to be a reasonable approximation for the period before the 1990￿ s when the
participation rate was either stable or increasing gradually (Poterba and Samwick,
1995). In contrast, during the 1990￿ s participation has increased substantially: from
1989 to 2002 the number of households who owned stocks increased by 74 percent,
and by 2002 half of the U.S. households had become stock owners (Investment
Company Institute (2002)). Modeling the participation boom in this later period
would require going beyond the stationary structure of our model, so we leave it
for future work. In this paper, we calibrate the participation rate excluding this
later period (1990 onward). We set the measure of stockholders, ￿, equal to 30
percent, which roughly corresponds to the stock market participation rate during
the 1980￿ s, when participation is de￿ned as holding any positive amount of stocks.
A signi￿cant fraction of stockholders during this period owned no more than a few
thousand dollars worth of stocks (see again Poterba and Samwick, 1995), so this
percentage should probably be interpreted as an upper bound on the percentage of
households actively participating in the stock market. In the next section we also
report the results by assuming a participation rate of 15 percent.
3.1.2. Heterogeneity in the EIS
There is a fairly large and active literature documenting heterogeneity in the
EIS. A ￿rst group of papers consider ￿ exible preference speci￿cations allowing for
non-homotheticity and estimate their parameters from the consumption Euler equa-
tion. Using this approach, Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994) ￿nd that the EIS
is monotonically increasing in income, and in some speci￿cations it is more than
three times larger for the highest decile compared to the lowest decile. They also
investigate heterogeneity in the EIS due to other factors but conclude that ￿most of
the variation in the EIS across the population is due to di⁄erences in consumption
(which can loosely be thought of as a proxy for lifetime wealth) and not to di⁄er-
ences in demographics and labor supply variables (p. 73).￿Similarly, Attanasio and
Browning (1995) con￿rm this ￿nding by employing an even more general functional
form, although they do not report point estimates for the EIS.4 Since stockholders
are on average much wealthier than the rest of the population, the ￿nding that
4It is possible to give some theoretical justi￿cations for why the EIS may increase with an
individual￿ s wealth level. For example, if individuals consume a variety of goods with di⁄erent
income elasticities, the intertemporal elasticity of the total consumption bundle will be higher for
wealthier individuals. This is because the share of necessity goods in total consumption is large
when the individual is poor, making her less willing to substitute these necessities across time.
In contrast, wealthy individuals will have a larger fraction of luxury goods in their bundle, which
are more easily substituted across time (see Browning and Crossley, 2000, for a proof.) Similarly,
non-homotheticity in preferences due to subsistence requirements, habit formation and so on, also
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elasticity is increasing in wealth also provides evidence of heterogeneity between
the EIS of stockholders and others.
A second group of papers focus directly on stockholders and non-stockholders
and estimate a separate elasticity parameter for each group (assuming homothetic
preferences within each group). For example, Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002)
use the Family Expenditure Survey data set from the U.K. and obtain elasticity val-
ues around 1 for stockholders, and between 0.1 to 0.2 for non-stockholders. Vissing-
Jłrgensen (1998) obtains very similar estimates from the Consumption Expenditure
Survey data on U.S. households.
With Epstein-Zin preferences, the risk aversion and the EIS can be calibrated
independently of each other. For transparency of results, we abstract from hetero-
geneity in risk aversion and set ￿h = ￿n = 3, which is within the range viewed
as plausible by many economists. This allows us to focus purely on the e⁄ects of
heterogeneity in the elasticity of substitution. In light of the empirical evidence
reviewed above, the EIS of the non-stockholders is set equal to 0.1, and the EIS of
the stockholders to 1.0.
Finally, the subjective discount factor, ￿; is set equal to 0.96 in order to match
the U.S. capital-output ratio of 3.3 reported by Cooley and Prescott (1995).
3.1.3. Borrowing constraints
These bounds are chosen to re￿ ect the fact that the stockholders can potentially
accumulate capital which can then be used as collateral for borrowing in the risk-
free asset, whereas the non-stockholders have to pay all their debt through future
wages. In the baseline case, the stockholders￿borrowing constraint is set equal to
four years of expected labor income (Bh = 4￿E (W)): The borrowing limit of the
non-stockholders is set to 30 percent of one year￿ s expected income, which is the
average credit limit typically imposed by short-term creditors, such as credit card
companies. Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameterization.
[Table 1 ￿about here]
4. Macroeconomic Results
This section quantitatively examines if limited participation and heterogeneity
in the EIS can explain the con￿ icting evidence discussed in the Introduction. Our
main argument is that the majority of the population with low elasticity has quanti-
tatively little e⁄ect on aggregates directly linked to wealth, such as investment and
output, which are determined by the high elasticity of the wealthy stockholders. On
the other hand, aggregate consumption mainly reveals the preferences of the poor,
who contributes substantially. Clearly, this argument relies on the idea that the
average investor is signi￿cantly di⁄erent than the average consumer violating the
representative-agent assumption. Thus, it is important to characterize the joint dis-
tribution of consumption and wealth in the U.S. data to document that empirically
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4.1. The Empirical Joint Distribution of Consumption and Wealth
Table 2 reports the fraction of aggregate consumption and wealth accounted
for by di⁄erent percentiles of the wealth distribution calculated from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data set.5 The ￿rst three rows display the size
distributions of di⁄erent measures of wealth, from the most comprehensive measure
in the ￿rst row (net worth), to the most speci￿c in the third (￿nancial assets).6 The
intermediate measure, which we call ￿productive wealth￿for lack of a better term,
is de￿ned as net worth minus equity in owner-occupied housing. We use these three
measures to show that the general conclusions drawn about the concentration of
wealth are not sensitive to the speci￿c de￿nition of wealth used. Finally, the last
row displays the share of aggregate consumption accounted for by households in
di⁄erent percentiles of the productive wealth distribution.
[Table 2 ￿about here]
The main observation from this table is that all three measures of wealth display
substantially higher concentration than consumption: households in the top 10
percent of the wealth distribution own three-quarters of aggregate productive wealth
but account for only about 17 percent of total consumption in the U.S. data.7 By
also including the next decile (top 20 percent), this group of households can be
thought of as the ￿investors￿since they hold about 90 percent of capital and land,
and virtually all ￿nancial assets. In contrast, observe the very gradual decline in
consumption expenditures moving down the wealth distribution. The bottom 80
percent own only 12 percent of productive wealth, yet contribute almost 70 percent
5Because we are interested in both wealth and consumption, we use the PSID instead of,
for example, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which contains more detailed information
about wealth but no consumption data, or the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE), which has
detailed consumption data but no comparable information on wealth holdings. One drawback
of PSID is that consumption is limited to food expenditures and rent payments. We take the
sum of these two components (which makes up about 40 percent of non-durables and services
expenditures) as our consumption proxy in Table 2. The ratio of this proxy to the non-durables and
services expenditures from the CE is roughly constant across income deciles, which suggests that
it could provide a reasonable approximation to the distribution of this more general consumption
measure. A data appendix, available from the author￿ s website, provides further details about the
construction of the consumption proxy and discusses how it compares to the CE data. Moreover,
the size distributions of both wealth measures are quite similar to those reported by Wol⁄ (2000)
using data from the SCF.
6￿Net worth￿is de￿ned as the current value of all marketable or fungible assets less the current
value of debts. Speci￿cally, it includes: (1) the net equity in owner-occupied housing; (2) other
real estate; (3) cash and demand deposits; (4) time and saving deposits, CDs and money market
accounts; (5) government bonds, corporate bonds and other ￿nancial securities; (6) cash surren-
der value of life insurance policies; (7) cash surrender values of pension plans, including IRAs,
Keogh and 401(k) plans; (8) corporate stocks and mutual funds; (9) net equity in unincorporated
businesses; (10) equity in trust funds. From the sum of these assets we subtract consumer debt in-
cluding auto loans and others. ￿Productive wealth￿is the sum of (2) through (10). The narrowest
de￿nition is ￿￿nancial wealth,￿and is the sum of (3) through (8).
7One drawback of existing micro data sets containing consumption data is that they tend to
underrepresent very rich households (i.e., those in the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution).
As a result, stockholders￿consumption is likely to be somewhat understated to the extent that the
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of total consumption. Thus this latter group can be thought of as the ￿consumers.￿
Expressing the same information in per-capita terms makes this distinction even
more striking: an average investor owns 29.3 times the productive wealth of an
average consumer, but consumes only 1.7 times more. These two groups are also
marked on Figure 1 (which plots the joint distribution) to give a visual impression
of their dramatically di⁄erent contributions to aggregate consumption and wealth.8
Moreover, the richest 30 percent￿ who own 99 percent of stocks before the 1990￿ s,
and hence whom we identify with the stockholders￿ held 88 percent of net worth
and more than 100 percent of ￿nancial assets.
[Figure 1 ￿about here]
The fact that consumption is more evenly distributed than physical wealth is
not totally surprising, since consumption is proportional to lifetime wealth inclusive
of human capital, which constitutes a substantial part of lifetime wealth and is more
evenly distributed than physical capital. As we shall see below, the limited partici-
pation model generates the same kind of wealth and consumption distributions and
thus captures this key component in explaining the evidence on the EIS.
4.2. Results from the Baseline Economy
Given how remarkably di⁄erent the average consumer and the average investor
are, it might seem almost obvious that each of these groups will (largely) determine
di⁄erent aggregates, and together with the heterogeneity in the EIS across these two
groups, a reconciliation of the evidence on the EIS would seem to follow immediately.
Why is it then not su¢ cient to merely document these two kinds of heterogeneity
in the data to qualify as a full explanation?
The reason is the existence of trade in the bond market, which provides a chan-
nel through which the non-stockholders￿preferences can potentially in￿ uence the
properties of aggregate quantities, including investment and output. For example,
in a companion paper using essentially the same model (augmented with capital
adjustment costs in production) we found that the non-stockholders￿preferences￿
and their low EIS in particular￿ play a key role in determining asset prices despite
the fact that they hold very little wealth in that model as well (Guvenen 2004).
Thus, it is essential to investigate the behavior of aggregates allowing for equilib-
rium interactions through the bond market, which is done in this subsection.
We begin by comparing the cross-sectional distributions of consumption and
wealth generated by the model to their empirical counterparts documented above.
With only two types of agents, the model generates two-point distributions for each
variable reported in the last two columns of Table 2. First, the wealth distribution
is extremely skewed in the model, with 89 percent of aggregate wealth owned by
8Figure 1 also makes clear that there is substantial heterogeneity among the very wealthy as
well. Thus, while in the baseline parameterization we take the fraction of stockholders to be 30
percent, most of the wealth is in fact held by a subset of these households. In the next section we
experiment with a lower participation rate of 15 percent to examine whether it makes a di⁄erence
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the stockholders, similar to the share of wealth owned by the top 30 percent in
the U.S. data. And second, consumption is much more evenly distributed, with 37
percent of aggregate consumption accounted for by the stockholders in the model,
compared to 43 percent in the data. So, the model is able to generate the signi￿-
cantly di⁄erent concentrations of these two variables, which is an essential element
in our explanation of the evidence on the value of the EIS.
[Table 3￿about here]
We now examine the implications of the limited participation model for business
cycle statistics. The ￿rst row of table 3 reports the standard deviations and the
￿rst-order autocorrelations of aggregate output (GDP), investment and consump-
tion from the U.S. data. First, in order to see why a low EIS seems di¢ cult to
reconcile with aggregate ￿ uctuations, consider the statistics reported on row 2 from
a representative agent RBC model with an EIS of 0.1, which otherwise has the same
parameterization as the baseline limited participation model. Notice that while the
volatility of consumption matches its empirical counterpart, the volatilities of out-
put and investment are overstated. The explanation is simple: because the agent
desires a very smooth consumption path, investment has to absorb the shock to her
income, making the former smooth at the expense of extra volatility in investment,
and consequently, in output. Moreover, all three variables are too persistent.
The third row reports the results when the EIS of the representative agent is
raised to 1.0. The implications of the model move closer to data: output and in-
vestment become less volatile, without a major change in consumption volatility.
The persistence of output and investment also come closer to their empirical coun-
terparts. While the persistence of consumption falls slightly, it is still signi￿cantly
higher than in the data.
The fourth row displays the moments from the baseline model. Comparing these
statistics to those on the previous two rows, it is clear that the limited participation
model behaves like the representative agent model with a high EIS (row 3) when
output and investment are concerned. It is interesting that the existence of many
households with a low EIS has almost no e⁄ect on the properties of investment
and output. In fact, the next row reports the results when the participation rate is
reduced to 15 percent, which shows no appreciable change in the behavior of output
and investment. As for consumption, the unconditional moments examined here do
not appear to be very sensitive to the EIS parameter.
To examine the robustness of this conclusion, we have experimented with a num-
ber of changes in the baseline parameterization such as increasing the persistence
and variance of aggregate shocks, reducing the participation rate (discussed above),
and relaxing the non-stockholders￿borrowing constraints to 4 years￿of expected
income. As an example, rows 6 to 8 report the results when the business cycle
duration is increased to 8 years from its baseline value of 6. The pattern seen here
applies to the other exercises described: the properties of output and investment
mainly re￿ ect the high EIS of the stockholders, while the statistics for consumption
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sumption growth with returns is informative about the value of the EIS parameter,
which is further analyzed in section 6..9
4.3. Heterogeneity in the EIS: Further Evidence
Our motivation for heterogeneity in the EIS came from a large empirical lit-
erature, which was discussed in Section 3.. However, a potential caveat in that
empirical evidence is pointed out by Laibson et. al. (1998). Their argument can be
summarized as follows. Suppose that there are two agents, a wealthy and a poor,
who both have the same EIS. If there are borrowing constraints which frequently
bind for the poor agent, her consumption will closely track her income and will
not respond to the interest rate unlike the consumption of the wealthy (and un-
constrained) agent. When the elasticities are recovered from consumption data on
these two agents, the poor one will appear as if she has a low EIS. If true, then
contrary to what we have assumed, there may not be any signi￿cant heterogeneity
in the EIS in the ￿rst place.
To further examine the evidence on the heterogeneity in the EIS we ￿rst turn
to cross-sectional data. An empirically well-documented di⁄erence between the
stockholders and the non-stockholders is that the consumption growth of the former
is more volatile than that of the latter: the ratio of the variances of consumption
growth, ￿2 ￿
￿ch￿
=￿2 (￿cn); ranges from 2 to 4 depending on the consumption
measure and the threshold stockholding level used to identify the two groups.10
This ￿nding seems somewhat surprising though. Given that the stockholders are
much wealthier than the rest and have access to ￿nancial markets, and low-income
households typically have higher unemployment risk and labor earnings uncertainty,
one might expect the former group￿ s consumption to be smoother than that of the
latter. In fact, it can easily be shown that a standard heterogenous-agent model
with identical preferences and borrowing constraints (as in Aiyagari, 1994) would
predict exactly that: because poor households cannot self-insure as e⁄ectively as
the wealthy, they keep hitting their borrowing constraints. Thus their consumption
will track their income and will be very volatile, contradicting this stylized fact.
In fact, a similar result is obtained in the limited participation model if prefer-
ence heterogeneity is ignored: When we set ￿h = ￿n = 1, the ratio of the variances
of consumption growth is 0.85, signi￿cantly lower than in the data. We have ex-
perimented with varying the shock size and its persistence, replacing the Markov
structure with AR(1) shocks, and changing the calibration of constraints, without
a noticeable increase in this ratio. Therefore, limited participation alone does not
9We do not examine a broader set of business cycle statistics, such as the behavior of labor
hours, etc., because the model is not designed to address those issues. It is of course possible
to extend the model to investigate those questions but that would require us to take a stand on
further di⁄erences between the stockholders and the non-stockholders (such as whether or not
they di⁄er in their labor supply elasticities, etc.) which would distract from the main point of the
paper.
10Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Poterba and Samwick (1995) document this ￿nding from
the PSID, Vissing-Jorgensen (1998) reports from the CEX, Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002)
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account for this fact. However, when we set ￿n = 0:1, this picture changes. Now,
the non-stockholders￿stronger desire for a smooth consumption path causes them
to trade vigorously in the bond market driving the interest rate down, and in-
creasing the equity premium. Now, the non-stockholders￿consumption is smoother
than that of the stockholders, who bear extra consumption volatility. As a result,
￿2 ￿
￿ch￿
=￿2 (￿cn) rises from 0.85 to 3.73
Second, a number of ￿nancial statistics implied by the model are very sensitive
to the EIS of the non-stockholders and hence make sharp predictions about its value.
We study these asset pricing implications in Guvenen (2004). We ￿nd that, starting
from an EIS value of 1 for both agents, the performance of the model improves dra-
matically as the non-stockholders￿EIS is gradually reduced. For ￿n ￿ 0:05￿0:2; the
model is able to match a variety of asset pricing phenomena, including all the facts
explained by the benchmark model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Examples
in this list include a high equity premium, a low risk-free rate; the predictability of
stock returns, the countercyclicality of the equity premium, among others. Given
that many of these asset pricing phenomena have been considered puzzles, these
￿ndings provide further support to the thesis that the non-stockholders have a low
EIS.
5. What is the E⁄ect of Limited Participation?
As noted earlier, the substantial wealth inequality is the driving force behind the
results in this paper. This section examines the role played by limited participation
in creating this wealth inequality. This is especially important because the severity
of the restriction imposed by shutting some agents out of the stock market is not a
priori obvious, since the only source of risk in the model is an aggregate shock with
relatively low variance and persistence, and the non-stockholders still have access
to the bond market. One could therefore suspect that some other feature of the
model￿ such as the Epstein-Zin preferences, heterogeneity in the EIS, or borrowing
constraints￿ is behind the wealth inequality.
To study the role of limited participation, in isolation, the following experiment
is conducted. First, consider a simpli￿ed version of the baseline model where all the
frictions and the preference heterogeneity is eliminated. More speci￿cally, suppose
that agents have CRRA utility with ￿h = ￿n = 1; both agents have access to all
markets and face no portfolio constraints. Clearly, this economy will reduce to a
representative-agent model, and assuming that both agents start out at the same
wealth level, there will be no trade in the bond market, no wealth inequality, and
no heterogeneity at all.
[Table 4 ￿about here]
Now consider introducing a single friction into this framework: suppose that the
second group of agents are restricted from participating in the stock market (but
otherwise impose no other constraint). As Table 4 shows, the e⁄ect of this simple
change is striking. Suddenly the stockholders come to hold almost 80 percent of
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there was no wealth inequality in that case), or in per-capita ￿gures, a stockholder
now owns nearly eight times the average wealth of a non-stockholder. They also
consume nearly 50 percent more per-capita than the non-stockholders. Further-
more, the two groups￿wealth holdings are now virtually uncorrelated, down from
perfect correlation with full participation. This example demonstrates the potential
of limited participation for generating substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity.
5.1. Where Does the Wealth Inequality Come From?
It is useful to begin by discussing how the wealth inequality in not generated.
First, it is not generated by the parameterization of preferences. Although prefer-
ence heterogeneity has some e⁄ect on the distribution of wealth, this e⁄ect is modest
for plausible changes in the EIS parameter as well as in the risk aversion. This can
be seen in Table 5 where the EIS varies from 0.1 up to 1.25, and the risk aversion
varies from 2 to 7, without a substantial change in inequality.
[Table 5 ￿about here]
Second, the wealth inequality is not generated by assumption, which is the case
with a limited participation model in an exchange economy setting. In that frame-
work, the stockholders are endowed, at time zero, with the entire future stream of
dividends in addition to their labor income, and hence, are wealthier by assumption.
In contrast, in the present model even when both agents start at the same wealth
level, the stockholders choose to accumulate more wealth in equilibrium. Further-
more, there is nothing in principle that prevents the stockholders from having zero
wealth in equilibrium despite the fact they must own all the capital stock: a stock-
holder could borrow in the bond market and invest all the proceeds in the ￿rm,
then pay the non-stockholder after production and consume the equity premium.
So, the stockholders are not wealthier simply because they own the total capital
stock. Then why are they?
The basic mechanism can be described as follows. For the sake of discussion,
consider a simpli￿ed version of the limited participation model without preference
heterogeneity, and where both agents face the same portfolio constraints on their
bond holdings.11 These features are not primary determinants of wealth inequality
as noted above, and this modi￿cation simpli￿es the following discussion.
[Figure 2 ￿about here]
In this environment, with in￿nite horizon and incomplete markets, both assets
earn average returns below the time preference rate. A well-known result in this
framework is that the wealth holdings of an agent will go to in￿nity if the (geometric)
11It should be noted that borrowing constraints also contribute to the skewness of the wealth
distribution. The non-stockholders can save only up to the maximum amount the stockholders are
allowed to borrow. When the stockholders come closer to their borrowing constraints, this puts
a downward pressure on bond return reducing the nonstockholders￿demand for wealth. But as
the example in Table 4 demonstrates, the concentration of wealth is still substantial without any
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average of return is equal to the time preference rate.12 This result also holds
when asset returns are stochastic (Chamberlain and Wilson 2000). Similarly, by
a continuity argument, one can show that asset demand becomes unbounded as
the average return approaches the time preference rate from below. Figure 2 plots
the typical long-run asset demand schedule for an agent in this environment and
illustrates the extreme sensitivity of asset demand to small variations in returns
near ￿:13 The key feature of the baseline model is that both the stock and the bond
return are close to the time preference rate, so agents are in this ￿ at region of the
asset demand schedule. Furthermore, the equilibrium stock return is much closer to
the time preference rate than is the bond return: ￿￿E(Rf) = 17:8￿(￿ ￿ E (Rs)):
This last observation, combined with the fact that the equilibrium returns Rs and
Rf are on the ￿ at section of the asset demand schedule, explains why stockholders
who have access to the slightly higher return, Rs; are willing to hold much more
wealth than non-stockholders.
Finally, the graph also makes clear that the wealth inequality cannot be simply
explained by the argument that the stockholders have access to a positive equity
premium and, hence, they are bound to become very wealthy in the long-run. This
is because the equilibrium asset returns could very well lie in the steep region of
the asset demand schedule, resulting in little wealth dispersion despite a positive
equity premium.
A second, and probably more intuitive, way to explain this mechanism is as
follows. With incomplete markets both agents want to accumulate precautionary
wealth, and this incentive is stronger for the non-stockholders who only have access
to one asset. However, the only way this group can accumulate wealth (bond) is
if stockholders are willing to borrow. In contrast, the stockholders have access to
capital accumulation, and they could smooth consumption even if the bond market
was completely shut down (just as a representative agent would do in the standard
RBC model). Furthermore, the asset demand of the non-stockholders is even more
inelastic because, in addition, they have a low EIS and hence have a very strong
desire for a smooth consumption pro￿le. Therefore, trade in the bond market for
consumption smoothing is more important for the non-stockholders than for the
stockholders. As a result, the stockholders will only trade in the bond market if
they can borrow at a low interest rate. This low interest rate in turn dampens the
non-stockholders￿demand for savings further, and they end up with little wealth in
equilibrium (and the stockholders end up borrowing very little).
The described mechanism also corresponds to an argument commonly given for
wealth inequality, but to our knowledge, which has not been formally investigated
in a general equilibrium framework: the wealthy become wealthy because they face
higher returns. This is exactly what happens in this model.
12See, for example, Aiyagari (1994) and references therein.
13Note that the stockholders and the non-stockholders will still have di⁄erent asset demand
schedules (despite having the same preferences and facing the same borrowing constraints) because
of di⁄erences in their investment opportunity sets. For the parameterizations used in this paper,
this di⁄erence in asset demand schedule turns out to be small, so we plot the same graph for both
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6. Another side of the Puzzle: The Empirical Estimates of the EIS
We now look at the model economy through the lens of empirical macro studies
and show that the aggregate consumption data reveals the low EIS of the majority,
i.e., the poor. Using simulated data we replicate existing studies which estimate
the EIS from the log-linearized consumption Euler equation (Hansen and Singleton,
1983, Hall, 1988, Campbell and Mankiw, 1989, among others). The estimated
equation is:
￿ct+1 = k + ￿r
f
t;t+1 + "t+1 (6)
where small letters denote the natural logarithms of variables, ￿ is the di⁄erence
operator,







and "t+1 is the agent￿ s forecast error with zero mean conditional on current infor-
mation: E("t+1j￿t) = 0:
Equation (6) is estimated via instrumental variables (IV) method using instru-
ments commonly used in the literature. Speci￿cally, our instrument set is an (8 ￿ 1)











t￿4), where i = h;n or A (referring to
aggregate consumption) depending on whether equation (6) is estimated using the
consumption of the stockholders, the non-stockholders, or the aggregate. Finally,
we concentrate on large sample results, so a sample path of 63,000 observations is
simulated and the ￿rst 3,000 periods are discarded.
[Table 6 ￿about here]
In the ￿rst step, the estimation is performed by assuming that the intercept
term k is constant through time (or equivalently, that it is uncorrelated with the
instruments). While this assumption is almost unanimously made in the empirical
macro literature, it will turn out to signi￿cantly a⁄ect the results. The ￿rst column
of Table 6 reports the estimated EIS parameter of each group (estimated using
that group￿ s consumption data) as well as for the aggregate (￿A). Although with
incomplete markets there is no explicit mapping from individual elasticities into
￿A; one can show that the latter will be close to a consumption-weighted average








)￿n), where the bars
indicate time-averages of each variable.14 This average in the baseline model is
0.47. However, the estimated value is 0.25, almost half of that ￿gure.




































: This last expression is the weighted
sum of the left hand side of equation 6 for the stockholders and the non-stockholders, where the
weights are proportional to each group￿ s contribution to aggregate consumption. If these weights
do not change much over time, or are uncorrelated with the instruments, the estimated parameter
on the right hand side will approximately be the same weighted average of the group-speci￿c EISs,
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One possible candidate for this bias is the omission of the conditional variance
term k from the regression because in simulated data it is signi￿cantly (negatively)
correlated with the instruments (lagged interest rates). Thus, we re-estimate (6) by
properly including the time-varying conditional variance calculated from the model￿ s
optimal decision rules. The e⁄ect is dramatic: the aggregate EIS now jumps to 0.48,
which is almost exactly the consumption-weighted elasticity. This exercise suggests
that, to the extent that our model economy is able to capture the dynamics of these
variables in the data, the previous estimates of the EIS are likely to be downward
biased.15
7. Conclusion
In this paper we attempted to reconcile two seemingly contradictory views about
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. A number of observations on growth
and aggregate ￿ uctuations suggest a value of EIS close to 1. In contrast, the co-
movement between aggregate consumption and interest rates￿ the focus of the em-
pirical consumption literature￿ implies a very weak relationship between the two,
suggesting an elasticity close to zero.
We showed that a simple and otherwise standard real business cycle model fea-
turing limited participation in the stock market and heterogeneity in the elasticities
is able to produce ￿ndings consistent with both capital and consumption ￿ uctua-
tions. In other words, an economy where the majority of households exhibit very
low intertemporal substitution is consistent with aggregate capital and output ￿ uc-
tuations as long as most of the wealth is held by a small fraction of population with a
high EIS. In this model limited participation in the stock market creates substantial
wealth inequality similar to the distribution of wealth between the stockholders and
the non-stockholders in the data. (This is in contrast to the majority of dynastic
models which are known to generate little wealth dispersion, and hence suggests
limited participation as an important factor in understanding distributional issues.)
Consequently, the properties of output and investment are almost entirely deter-
mined by the high-elasticity stockholders, whereas consumption is strongly a⁄ected
by the inelastic non-stockholders who contribute substantially. This dichotomy ex-
plains how the preferences of wealthy are hardly detectable in consumption data
but still strongly in￿ uence the economy￿ s aggregates.
The cross-sectional richness of the model allowed us to address related questions.
For example, if the low EIS estimates of the poor were indeed due to severe bor-
15In principle one can apply the same correction described here (by including the conditional
variance of consumption growth) to the Euler equation estimations in the literature, such as Hall￿ s
(1988). In practice however, computing the empirical conditional variance is not as straightforward
as in the model (where we have access to individuals￿explicit decision rules). To gain an idea
about the potential empirical importance of this correction, we constructed a simple measure of
vart (￿ct+1) for each t; by calculating the rolling sample variance of consumption growth in the
subsequent N periods. Including this term increases the estimate of the EIS from roughly zero, to
0.3-0.6 range (depending on the choice of N, and the instrument set used) with an average slightly
higher than 0.4. To save space, these further results are reported in an appendix available from
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rowing restrictions instead of genuine preference heterogeneity (as argued by some
papers), such a model would have implications inconsistent with cross-sectional and
asset price data. On the other hand the current model explains those facts when
preference heterogeneity is properly acknowledged, providing further support to the
thesis the poor have low EIS.
The idea that aggregates can be better explained by the interaction of heteroge-
nous agents rather than by a representative agent￿ s intertemporal problem with a
variety of frictions has important consequences. For example, in a representative-
agent economy aggregate consumption and savings are determined by the very same
preferences, whereas in the current model, they are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from one
another. We conclude that, as a result, economic analyses as well as policy discus-
sions based on average elasticities may be seriously misguided.
A Appendix: Policy Implications
In the foregoing analysis our goal has been to demonstrate the interaction be-
tween wealth inequality and heterogeneity in the EIS from a positive perspective.
We now conduct a policy experiment to demonstrate that one can reach misleading
policy conclusions if this heterogeneity is ignored.
It has long been recognized in the public ￿nance literature that the welfare
e⁄ects of capital income taxation critically depend on the degree of intertemporal
substitution (Summers 1981, King and Rebelo 1990). Indeed, Hall (1988) concludes
that his estimate of a small EIS also imply a weak response of savings to changes in
interest rates. To the contrary, we argue that the e⁄ect of taxation on savings will
be determined by the wealth-weighted average elasticity measure, which is￿ given
the enormous wealth inequality￿ very close to that of the stockholders.
In order to demonstrate this point, we study a simple tax reform problem similar
to the one studied by Lucas (1990). Imagine that initially the government imposes
a ￿ at-rate tax on capital income and returns the proceeds to households in a lump-
sum fashion. At a certain date, capital income tax is completely eliminated and
agents have not previously anticipated it. The initial tax rate is set equal to 36
percent which roughly corresponds to the average rate in the U.S. All aspects of the
baseline model remain intact.
In order to provide a comparison to the existing literature, we ￿rst consider
the welfare gain from this reform in a representative-agent framework. If the agent
has ￿ = 1:0, the welfare bene￿t of this policy is 0.93 percent of consumption per
period￿ taking the transition path into account. Although it may not seem much,
as Lucas argues, this is about 20 times the gain from eliminating the business cycle
￿ uctuations, and two times the gain from eliminating 10 percent in￿ ation rate.
However, if we assume that the agent has ￿ = 0:1, the welfare gain is reduced to
0.4 percent of consumption instead, mainly because now the transition takes about
110 years compared to about 23 years in the former case.
Now suppose that the limited participation economy is subjected to the same
tax experiment. The welfare gain is 0.82 percent of total consumption.16 In e⁄ect,
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this economy behaves as if it was populated only by agents with unit elasticity and
non-stockholders￿preferences virtually vanished from the problem.
There is an even more interesting side to this problem that transpires from
explicitly modelling heterogeneity: based on policy experiments like the one above,
some economists have argued in favor of eliminating capital income taxes. But, a
representative-agent framework masks the question of ￿who gains and who loses
from this reform?￿In reality, all agents are not identical, and as we have shown
so far, in some dimensions, they di⁄er substantially. So, it is compelling to take
this question seriously and break down the gains from this reform. It turns out
that, in consumption terms, the stockholders gain by 5.4 percent, whereas the non-
stockholders, who constitute 70 percent of the population, actually lose 2.1 percent
of their consumption. Clearly, this is a di⁄erent conclusion than what comes out
from the representative-agent economy.
to attain the same social welfare index as without taxes and makes transfers to agents in such a
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Table 1: Baseline Parametrization
Annual Model
Parameter Value
￿ Time discount rate 0.96
￿h Risk aversion of stockholders 3
￿n Risk aversion of non-stockholders 3
￿h EIS of stockholders 1
￿n EIS of non-stockholders 0.1
￿ Participation rate 0.3
￿11 Prob (good state j good state) 2/3
￿22 Prob (bad state j bad state) 2/3
￿Z Standard deviation of Z 0.031
￿ Capital share 0.4
￿ Depreciation rate 0.08
Bh Borrowing limit of stockholders 4W
Bn Borrowing limit of non-stockholders 0:3W
Note: The mean of the technology shock is a scaling parameter and is
normalized to one. The borrowing limits are indexed to the average
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Table 2: The Concentration of Wealth and Consumption
Percentage Share of ￿Variable￿Held By Wealth Percentiles
U.S. data Model
Wealth Percentile 1 ￿ 10 11 ￿ 30 31 ￿ 50 51 ￿ 100 1 ￿ 30 1 ￿ 30 31 ￿ 100
Variable:
Net Worth 0:702 0:181 0:087 0:030 0:883 0:89 0:11
Productive Wealth 0:742 0:201 0:054 0:002 0:942 0:89 0:11
Financial Assets 0:832 0:210 0:026 ￿0:068 1:043 0:89 0:11
Consumption 0:169 0:251 0:205 0:373 0:429 0:37 0:63
Notes: The data are drawn from the 1989 PSID family ￿le and wealth
supplement. All variables are de￿ned at household level. The consump-
tion measure is a proxy constructed from food expenditures and rent
as explained in footnote 5. Productive wealth is de￿ned as net worth
minus equity in owner-occupied housing; where net worth and ￿nancial
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Table 3: Business Cycle Statistics
Standard deviation (%) Autocorrelation
Y I C Y I C
(1) U.S. data 2.2 8.5 1.5 0.52 0.36 0.57
Models: Panel A: Baseline parameterization
(2) RA (EIS = 0:1) 3.6 10.8 1.5 0.65 0.49 0.98
(3) RA (EIS = 1:0) 3.0 8.7 1.7 0.52 0.33 0.94
(4) Limited Participation 3.0 8.8 1.5 0.53 0.36 0.96
Panel B: Fraction holding stocks is 15 percent
(5) Limited Participation 3.1 8.9 1.5 0.54 0.37 0.96
Panel C: Business cycle duration is 8 years
(6) RA (EIS = 0:1) 4.1 11.3 1.9 0.76 0.63 0.98
(7) RA (EIS = 1:0) 3.4 9.1 2.1 0.65 0.45 0.95
(8) Limited Participation 3.5 9.4 2.0 0.67 0.47 0.96
Notes: The empirical statistics of the U.S. economy are computed from
the National Income and Product Accounts data at yearly frequencies
covering 1959:1999. All variables are ￿rst logged and the trend is re-
moved with Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
The consumption measure consists of expenditures on non-durables and
services. In Panel B, the borrowing constraint of stockholders is in-
creased to 8￿ W to keep the total wealth that can be accumulated by
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Table 4: The E⁄ect of Limited Participation on Cross-sectional Heterogeneity
Statistics in a limited participation model with
otherwise identical agents
Stockholders Non-stockholders
Share of aggregate wealth 0.78 0.22
Per-capita wealth 8.27 1.00
Per-capital consumption 1.48 1.00
Std. of log consumption .018 .019
Correlation of consumption 0.44 0.77
with income
Cross-correlation between the two groups￿ :
Consumption Income Wealth
0.72 0.87 0.04
Notes: To make comparison across columns easier, the per-capita wealth
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Table 5: Wealth Inequality for Various Parameter Values
Parameters Share of Wealth Held By:
EISh EISn RRAh RRAn Stockholders Non-stockholders
1:0 0:1 3:0 3:0 0.88 0.12
1:0 1:0 3:0 3:0 0.85 0.15
1:25 0:25 2:0 7:0 0.87 0.13
0:33 0:33 2:0 2:0 0.85 0.15
0:33 0:14 2:0 4:0 0.86 0.14
Note: ￿ and ￿ denote the EIS and relative risk aversion coe¢ cients
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Table 6: Estimation of the Log-Linearized Euler Equation with Risk-Free Return
Non-stockholder Stockholders Aggregate
True Value of EIS 0.10 1.00 0.47
kf = constant
EIS 0.11 0.54 0.25
(t-stats) (22:15) (51:1) (36:82)
kf = constant + (1=2￿) ￿ vart (￿ct+1)
EIS 0.101 1.07 0.48
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Figure 1: The Fraction of Aggregate Consumption Accounted for by Households
Who Own a Given Fraction of Aggregate Wealth
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Figure 2: Long-Run Wealth Distribution in the Presence of Return Di⁄erences
(Limited Participation)
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